

Contributions to Applied Cartography

Radovan Pavić

According to the increasing awareness of the importance, advantages and feasibility of representing/visualizing spatial relations and spatial content through corresponding cartography – maps are becoming increasingly more frequent and elaborate when one needs to represent some aspect of reality from various standpoints: economical, natural scientific or political. Some contents practically impose the need for applied cartography which is especially true of international-political, military, geopolitical and transport issues. Therefore, mass communication media have been increasingly accepting and adopting specific cartography as significant content which successfully compete with the importance of the text itself – this is the case everywhere, including in Croatia. The French geographical-political-cartographic school is the model and exceptional accomplishment. It also has predecessors in the German/Nazi geopolitical school from the first half of the 20th century.

Maps and the Concept of Spatial Culture

Position characteristics – location, position and spatial relations are observed, understood and interpreted best using maps: they are an image of reality which geographers (and not only geographers) need to be able to see at all times. Therefore, when maps are concerned, one needs to study them within the context of spatial culture – which can be defined as the introduction of characteristics associated with space (and which are immanent) into a complex aiming to understand particular modes of social reality and its changes – of course, where it is suitable and in a suitable way. It is because space is not a neutral frame of happening, but it can be one

of the most influential foundations and factors of that happening, which at the same time means the exclusion of the so-called geographic determinism. However, while determinism is excluded, the same is not true for stronger or weaker, more or less clear influences. Without those influences, it would not be the true, but narrower reality, i.e. its origin and development.

According to the roughest categorization, there are two kinds of maps. General geographic with synthetic content, because they contain a multitude of content intending to represent the objective and complete reality in the most comprehensive way possible. There are also applied maps which only represent some content, problems and ideas, and there are two types: a) analytic, which represent only one content, b) synthetic, which represent more specific contents, not by simple accumulation, but rather in the form of relation and interaction between certain content grouped around a common idea or issue. The nature of analytic maps is positivistic-informative. They feature/represent some content which can be considered on its own. Thus they are really only an illustration or supplement. On the contrary – complex maps include several inter-related contents associated with phenomena and processes in space, making them interpretative. They include all contents relevant to certain understandings and interpretations and are thus not just an illustration, but an important aspect in understanding reality. Applied/complex maps are not just illustrations and supplements of text, but the diversity of their relevant interrelated contents is at the same time origin of new insight, meaning they can precede text or at the very least be its peer. Applied complex maps can be used to read complex reality, but it is more an issue

of personnel than the subject of this paper.

Without further ado – it is best to present some possibilities and examples of our applied cartography from the field of transport relations, geopolitics and geostrategy, distinguishing three cartographic fields, each of which is creative and synergizing in its own way: first – individuals who use historical cartographic sources for a particular purpose, second – creators of applied maps, and third – people who draw and realize them technically.

Therefore, what follows are some examples from the second and third group by the same author as this paper's.

Map No. 1 Cold War Geostrategic Position of USSR

Due to the vast space, overlapping characteristics (transitional areas), as well as the need to indicate only basics of the noted geostrategic division of the area, they can only be represented as highly generalized, but are still in accordance with main principles, criteria and spatial relations.

1 – a) ① – True Soviet Geostrategic Heartland, consisting of the geostrategically even safer Lena Land (2) between Yenisey and Lena, as the absolute Heartland.

1 – b) 1a – The largest part of the so-called South East Asia ("five states") is the border area of the true Heartland.

2 – ③ – Kazakhstanian-Mongolian and Chinese part of Heartland (Xinjiang, Tiber, Qinghai, Gansu, part of inland Mongolia)

3 – ④ – Russian European Heartland, which can be called like that only conditionally, so it is better to refer to it as the political/conditional Heartland.

Prilozi primijenjenoj kartografiji

Radovan Pavić

U skladu sa sve razvijenijom svijetom o značenju, prednostima i velikoj uvjerljivosti prikazivanja/vizualizacije prostornih odnosa i sadržaja u prostoru putem odgovarajuće kartografije – zemljovidni prikazi postaju sve učestaliji i razrađeniji kada treba dočarati neki oblik stvarnosti i to s vrlo različitih stajališta bilo onog gospodarskog, prirodoslovnog ili politološkog. Pri tome neki sadržaji upravo nameću potrebu postojanja aplikativne kartografije što naročito vrijedi za pitanja međunarodno-političkog, vojnog, geopolitičkog i prometnog značaja i značenja. Zbog toga sredstva masovnih komunikacija sve više prihvaćaju i udomljuju specifičnu kartografiju kao bitne sadržaje koji se u svojoj važnosti uspješno natječu s važnošću samog teksta – tako je svugdje, pa tako i u Hrvatskoj. Pri tome kao na uzor i naročito dostignuće treba ukazati na francusku geografsko-političko-kartografsku školu koja ima i starije preteče i to iz redova njemačke/nacističke geopolitičke škole iz prve polovice 20. st.

Zemljovidi i pojam prostorne kulture

Osobine položajnosti – smještaj, položaj, prostorni odnosi najbolji su u uočavanju, shvaćanju i interpretiranju pomoću zemljovida: oni su slika stvarnosti koju geografi (i ne samo oni) uvijek moraju imati pred očima. I zato, kada je o zemljovidima riječ, potrebno ih je promatrati u kontekstu koji se odnosi na prostornu kulturu – a nju je moguće definirati ovako: ona znači uvođenje osobina u svezi s prostorom (koje su mu imanentne) u kompleks kojim se pokušava razumjeti određene vidove društvene stvarnosti i njezinih promjena – naravno tamo gdje je to primjereno i na način na koji je primjeren. I to zato jer prostor nije nikakav neutralni okvir

zbivanja, nego može biti i jedan od utjecajnijih temelja i čimbenika tih zbivanja, što ujedno znači da je svaki tzv. geografski determinizam pri tome isključen. Ali, dok je determinizam isključen, to ne vrijedi za jače ili slabije, jasnije ili nejasnije utjecaje, jer se bez tih utjecaja ne radi o istinskoj, nego tek o suženoj stvarnosti, tj. njezinom nastanku i razvitku.

Prema najgrubljoj podjeli, zemljovidi mogu biti dvojaki: prvo, oni opći geografski, koji su sintetizirajućeg sadržaja, jer sadrže što je moguće više različitih sadržaja kojima se nastoji što potpunije prikazati objektivna i cjelovita stvarnost. I – drugo – postoje primjenjeni zemljovidi koji prikazuju samo neke određene sadržaje, probleme i ideje, a i oni mogu biti dvojaki: a) analitički kada prikazuju samo jedan sadržaj, i zatim b) sintetizirajući kada prikazuju više raznih specifičnih sadržaja, ali ne na način jednostavne kumulacije, nego u obliku povezanosti i međuutjecaja pojedinih sadržaja okupljenih oko neke zajedničke ideje ili nekog problema. Analitički zemljovidi su po svojoj naravi pozitivističko-informativni. Oni donose/prikazuju neki sadržaj koji stoji kao posebnost i sam za sebe. Zato su oni zapravo samo ilustracija i dopuna nečega. Za razliku – kompleksni zemljovidi uključuju više međusobno povezanih sadržaja u svezi s pojavama i procesima u prostoru, i zato su oni interpretativnog karaktera. Oni uključuju sve sadržaje koji su relevantni za određena shvaćanja i tumačenja, i zato nisu tek puka ilustracija, nego bitni aspekt u razumijevanju stvarnosti. Primijenjeni/kompleksni zemljovidi ne samo da nisu ilustracija i posljedica/dopuna onoga što se iznosi u tekstu, nego su zbog različitosti relevantnih međusobno povezanih sadržaja ujedno i izvorište i novih uvida, dakle oni mogu i prethoditi tekstu, ili su barem njegov apsolutno

ravnopravni partner. Iz primijenjenih kompleksnih zemljovida iščitava se i kompleksna stvarnost, ali to više nije pitanje ovih teza, nego je kadrovski problem.

No o svemu ne treba duljiti – bolje je prikazati neke mogućnosti i primjere naše primijenjene kartografije i to s područja prometnih odnosa, geopolitike i geostrategije razlikujući pri tome tri kartografska područja od kojih je svako kreativno na svoj način pri čemu dolazi i do sinergije s odgovarajućim rezultatima: prvo – ono gdje se pojedinci služe povijesnim kartografskim izvorima za neku određenu svrhu, drugo – u što se ubrajaju oni koji su kreatori primijenjenih zemljovida, i treće – oni koji ih tehnički/crtački ostvaruju.

Zato će se na ovom mjestu iznijeti nekoliko primjera iz spomenute druge i treće skupine i to iz pera istog autora.


Zemljovid br. 1. Hladnoratovski geostrateški položaj SSSR-a

Zbog naročite veličine prostora, osobina koje se preklapaju (prijelazna područja), kao i potrebe da se naglase samo osnove navedene geostrateške razdiobe tog prostora, mogu se prikazati samo u okviru visokog stupnja generalizacije, koja, međutim, gledajući onako grosso modo, ipak poštuju glavna načela, kriterije i prostorne odnose.

1 – a) ① – Pravi sovjetski geostrateški Heartland u kojem se nalazi geostrateški još sigurniji Lena Land ② između Jeniseja i Lene, kao apsolutni Heartland.

1 – b) 1a – Najveći dio tzv. područja jugozapadne Azije ("pet država") je granični prostor pravog Heartlanda.

2 – ③ – Kazahstansko-mongolski i kineski dio Heartlanda (Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, dio unutrašnje Mongolije)



Map No. 1. Cold War Geostrategic Position of USSR
 Zemljovid br. 1. Hladnoratovski geostrateški položaj SSSR-a

4 - © - An important geostrategic characteristic of the Russian arctic space is that it still behaves as a Southern Heartland on mainland. The more intense opening of the arctic maritime route related to climate changes is still a distant possibility, but one that is obviously going to cause new geostrategic relations: due to

international transport, the single mainland-sea (once Soviet, now Russian) Heartland is going to be split into two parts.

5 - Border zone coast (Rimland) surrounding Heartland.

5 - a) © - Although much of the Far East Rimland (Sea of Okhotsk, Kamchatka, and area around the

Bering Strait) belongs to Russian Federation, Russian geostrategic characteristics can not be described as true Rimland because it lacks the essential maritime component. In addition, Rimland is an exceptionally Western-geostrategic term. Thus the Soviet (Russian) Far East Rimland is merely strain without content.

3 – ④ – Ruski europski Heartland koji se tako može nazvati samo uvjetno zbog čega je bolje govoriti o političkom/uvjetnom Heartlandu.

4 – ⑤ – Važna je geostrateška osobina da se ruski arktički prostor danas još uvijek ponaša kao južnije locirani Heartland na kopnu. Intenzivnije otvaranje arktičke pomorske rute u svezi klimatskih promjena još je poprilično daleka mogućnost, ali će ona očitovati nastanak novih geostrateških odnosa: zbog međunarodnog prometa jedinstveni kopneno – morski (nekada sovjetski, a danas ruski) Heartland bit će presječen na dva dijela.

5 – Obala rubne zone (Rimland) koja okružuje Heartland.

5 – a) ⑥ – Iako Ruskoj Federaciji pripada znatan dio Rimlanda na Dalekom istoku (Ohotsko more, Kamčatka, prostor oko Beringovog tjesnaca), ruske se geostrateške osobine tu ne mogu okarakterizirati kao istinski Rimland, jer mu nedostaje bitna maritimna sastavnica, a osim toga, Rimland je izuzetno zapadnjačko-geostrateški pojam. Sovjetski je, (ruski) dakle, Rimland na Dalekom istoku tek natega bez sadržaja.

5 – b) – Obala ostalog Pravog globalnog Rimlanda. Prostoru Rimlanda pripada ne samo niz država na kopnu, lociranih oko Heartlanda, nego i niz otoka.

6 – H + R – Važno je uočiti kako je Kina u isto doba i izrazita heartlandska, ali i izrazita rimlandska zemlja, a to je očitovati najpovoljniji geostrateški položaj na "svjetskom otoku" (Europa, Azija, Afrika).

7 – 7) – Važnost geostrateškog položaja SSSR-a u doba hladnog rata vidi se i po relativno bliskoj lokaciji ruskog Heartlanda u odnosu na Angloameriku, pri čemu je za SAD povoljno da na sjeveru ima tamponski kanadski prostor.

8 – a) – Mongolija kao glavni povijesni i suvremeni tamponski međuprostor između Rusije i Kine (t.).

8 – b) – Pored Mongolije, SSSR za Hladnog rata ima i tamponsku zonu u Europi (Varšavski ugovor iz 1955, što je povijesno najdalji prodor Istoka prema Zapadu.

9 – Položaj SSSR-a u okruženju – ovisno o pojedinim razdobljima, ono je bilo dvostruko: jednu je vrstu organizirao Zapad (NATO, 1949., CENTO pakt 1955., 1979.), a drugo je ovisilo o odnosima s Kinom.

9 – a) – (Turska – Irak – Iran – Pakistan): države CENTO pakta (Central Treaty Organisation u funkciji okruženja Sovjetskog bloka u zoni Rimlanda (od izvanregionalnih članica u tom su bloku bili još i Velika Britanija i SAD).

9 – b) J-SAD – Japansko – američki obrambeni sporazumi (1951, 1960) su u funkciji obrane Japana, ali i okruženja SSSR-a.

9 – c) – U funkciji okruženja SSSR-a treba, ovisno o pojedinim razdobljima, spomenuti i Kinu.

9 – d) a,b,c – Izravni granični dodiri sovjetskog bloka i NATO-a (norveška, istočnonjemačka, češka i turska granica). Ovakav izravni dodir očitovati je geostrateški bio izuzetno osjetljiv, ali i nikada nije došlo do nekog sukoba, jer su se obje vevlasti čuvale svega što je u hladnoratovskim uvjetima Svijet moglo odvesti u katastrofu.

Zemljovid br. 2.

Glavna težišta ruskih državnosti (regije jezgre) i odnos prema morima

Zemljovid je uvelike pojednostavljen/generaliziran, jer potpisanim sve potankosti nisu poznate, te stoga predstavlja samo pokušaj jednog povijesnog/zemljopisnog prikaza u smislu opoviještene geografije i geografizirane povijesti.

1 – Jedna od mogućih inačica međe poluotočne i kopnene Europe kojoj pripadaju ruske zemlje. One su prvenstveno karakterizirane kontinentalnošću, što znači i stalnom borbom za izlaze i pristupe do otvorenih mora

2 – a) – Zatvoreno Baltičko, Crno i Egejsko more, kao i Kaspijsko jezero.

2 – b) – Otvoreno Sredozemlje, ali ipak zatvoreno u odnosu na svjetsko more.

2 – c) – Bijelo more, kao jedini mogući otvoreni izlaz Rusije za veze sa Zapadom, koji je Rusija povijesno

intenzivno koristila, naročito poslije uspostavljanja mongolsko-osmanlijske barijere prema Crnom moru.

3 – a) 1, 2 – Glavne izvorne regije jezgre russtva: 1 – Kijevska Rusija iz 9.st, cvat do 13. st. (do mongolske pohare), 2 – Moskovija (moskovska velika kneževina iz 12. st. koja kao regija jezgre zamjenjuje Kijevsku Rusiju).

3 – b) 3 – Od ruskih zemalja važna je još jedino Bjelarus, dok je sve ostalo (obale Baltika, Kavkaz, dio centralne Azije, Sibir) – poprište carskog osvajaštva pri čemu je ono u Sibiru najmanje zazorno, jer se doista radi o jednom demografskom i politogenetskom desertumu. U vrijeme Kijevske Rusije, russtvo je bilo uspostavljeno i na Crnom moru, gdje je na mjestu Odesse postojala ruska tvrđava, ali je ona stradala od Polovaca u 11. st. Kasnije širenje Rusije na jug mora se smatrati opravdanim jer je ono za pravo rekonkvista u odnosu na Tatare i Osmanlije.

4 – a – U najranijem razdoblju ruske povijesti funkcionira plovidbeni put Baltik – Zapadna Dvina (Daugava) – Dnjeper – Crno more – Konstantinopol kao tzv. Grčka cesta, koja je prekinuta mongolskom invazijom u 13. st.

5 – a) – Mongolski prodor (13. st.) olakšan stepskom prohodnošću koji ruši Kijevsku Rusiju (1), zbog čega se regija jezgre i težišta ruske državnosti pomiče prema Moskoviji (2), koja je zatvoreni šumski i vrlo bogat hidrografski prostor pogodan za izbjegavanje apsolutne strane dominacije i kontrole. U toj novoj i logičnoj politogenetskoj jezgri moskovski veliki knez postaje knez sviju Rusa, i oko te će se jezgre okupiti ruske zemlje, i iz te će jezgre krenuti oslobodilački pokreti Rusije protiv Mongola, kao i daljnja osvajanja prema Sibiru, Baltiku, Crnom moru i Kavkazu. U južnoj Rusiji/Ukrajini od 13. st. formira se dugotrajna mongolska barijera (Zlatna horda), a zatim i ona osmanlijska koja priječi pristup russtva crnomorskom bazenu, ali i Aziji kroz Vrata naroda. Međutim, treba naglasiti da je Kijevska Rusija i prije mongolske provale imala problema s pristupom Crnom moru zbog Pečenjega, Hazara i

5 - b) - Coast of the remaining True Global Rimland. Rimland includes a series of continental countries around Heartland, but also a series of islands.

6 - H + R - It is important to note that China was at the time exceptionally Heartland- and Rimland-like, and it is obviously the most favourable geostrategic position in the "global island" (Europe, Asia, Africa).

7 - 7) - Importance of USSR's geostrategic position during the Cold War can also be seen in the relative closeness of the Russian Heartland in relation to Anglo-America, with USA having the favourable Canadian buffer zone.

8 - a) - Mongolia as the main historical and contemporary buffer zone between Russia and China (t.).

8 - b) - In addition to Mongolia, USSR also had a buffer zone in Europe during the Cold War (Treaty of Warsaw from 1955), which represents the historically furthest breach of the East toward the West.

9 - Position of USSR in context - it was twofold, depending on the period: one was organized by the West (NATO 1949, CENTO 1955, 1979), and the other depended on relations with China.

9 - a) - (Turkey - Iraq - Iran - Pakistan): CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) countries in function of surrounding the Soviet Bloc in the Rimland (Great Britain and USA were also in the bloc).

9 - b) J-SAD - Japan-American treaties (1951, 1960) for defending Japan and surrounding USSR.

9 - c) - China also has to be mentioned related to surrounding USSR.

9 - d) a,b,c - Direct border contacts of the Soviet Bloc and NATO (Norwegian, East German, Czech and Turkish border). Such a direct contact was clearly very sensitive from a geostrategic perspective, but there were never any conflicts, because both big powers guarded against everything which could have led the World to catastrophe in the Cold War conditions.

Map No. 2
Main Centres of Russian Sovereignties (Core Regions) and Attitude toward Seas

The map is greatly simplified/generalized because the author is not aware of all the details, so it is just an attempt at a historical/geographic representation in the sense of historized geography and geographized history.

1 - One possible version of the border between the peninsular and continental Europe which Russian lands belong to. They are primarily characterized by continentality, which means a constant struggle for exits and access to open seas.

2 - a) - Closed Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Aegean Sea, as well as the Caspian Sea.

2 - b) - Open Mediterranean, but still closed in comparison to the global sea


2 - c) - White Sea, as the only possible open exit of Russia for connecting with the West, which Russia historically intensively used, especially after establishing the Mongolian - Ottoman barrier toward the Black Sea.

3 - a) 1, 2 - Main source core regions of Russianhood: 1 - Kievan Russia

from the 9th century, flourished until the 13th century (until Mongolian devastation), 2 - Grand Duchy of Moscow, Moscovia (great Moscow principality from the 12th century which replaced Kievan Russia as the core region)

3 - b) 3 - Belarus is the only other important Russian country, while everything else (Baltic Sea coasts, Caucasus, part of central Asia, Siberia) - is the scene of imperial conquest, with the one in Siberia the least objectionable because it is a demographic and politogenetic desert. During the Kievan Russia, Russianhood was also established at the Black Sea, where there was a Russian fortress in place of Odessa, but the fortress was destroyed by Cumans in the 11th century. Subsequent expansion of Russia to the South has to be considered reasonable because it is actually a reconquest in relation to Tatars and Ottomans.

4 - a - The earliest period of Russian history saw the functioning of the maritime route Baltic Sea - Western Dvina (Daugava) - Dnieper - Black Sea - Constantinople as the so-called Greek route, which was broken up by the Mongolian invasion in the 13th century.





Map No. 2. Main Centres of Russian Sovereignties (Core Regions) and Attitude toward Seas
 Zemljovid br. 2. Glavna težišta ruskih državnosti (regije jezgre) i odnos prema morima

◀ Map No. 2, Legend

◀ Tumač znakova zemljivoda br. 2

5 – a) – Mongolian invasion (13th century) facilitated by passable steppes, ravaging Kievan Russia (1), due to which the core region and the centres of Russian sovereignty moves toward Moscovia (2), which is a closed forest and hydrographically reach space suitable for avoiding absolute sides of domination and control. In this new and logical politogenetic core, the Moscow grand duke became the duke of all Russian, and Russian countries are going to gather around that core and a go to liberate Russia from the Mongols, as well as conquer Siberia, Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Caucasus. A lasting Mongolian barrier (Golden Horde) formed in South Russia/Ukraine in the 13th century, and subsequently also an Ottoman one blocking the access of Russianhood to the Black Sea, as well as Asia through the Doorway of Nation. However, it has to be pointed out that Kievan Russia had problems accessing the Black Sea because of Pechenegs, Khazars and others even before the Mongolian invasion. After the plague in the 14th century, while the European West was economically developing and preparing for global conquests during time of very favourable navigation – Russia was just liberating from the savage Asian devastation, which is obviously one reason for its overall lapsing.

5 – b) – Broad space of the Doorway of Nation, part of Ukraine and the Azovian-Black Sea littoral as an unstable zone exposed to invasions from the East which made it significantly more difficult to establish Russianhood in its South until Peter the Great (18th century).

6 – Russian expansion toward the Baltic Sea and lasting struggle with Sweden, which was greatly suppressed (Battle of Poltava in 1709), was sealed with the founding and development of Saint Petersburg from 1703. The exceptional importance of sea for Russia at the time can be seen from the fact that Saint Petersburg was the capital of Russia between 1712 and 1918: a harbour and openness are more important than continentally closed and isolated Moscovia.

7 – a) – Due to the Mongolian-Ottoman barrier toward the South, Russia had to focus not only toward the Baltic Sea, but also toward cold Northern Seas (White Sea). Archangelsk was founded in 16th century with famous Novgorod traders. Archangelsk became (until foundation of Saint Petersburg) an important Russian harbour for commerce with the West. In searching fur-bearing animals the Pechora River area was reached.

8 – a) – For the first time since the Mongolian Invasion, conquests of Ivan the Terrible (16th century) enabled Moscovia to reach the South (also conquering the Archangelsk water supply system) and allowed Russia to get close to the Doorway of Nation which lead to Siberia and enabled Volga to be the great Russian backbone. Russia reached the Caspian Sea, but this did not have a decisive impact, because it does not lead anywhere except the competing Persia.

8 – b) – After the former Norman navigational system Baltic Sea – Western Dvina – Dnieper – Black Sea (the mentioned "Greek route"), Volga (b) became an important internal connection and Russian backbone. Novgorod traders traded via rivers toward the South (Black Sea and Constantinople) prior to the Mongolian period.

9 – At the end of the 17th century, Russia conquered Azov, which means it also had to conquer Kerch Strait, and in 1792 coasts of the Black Sea up to the mouth of Dniester to Novorossiysk belonged to Russia, after Odessa was conquered by the Turks (1791), and Krim was annexed in 1830.

10 – 16th century – The Russian invasion of Siberia started as early as the 16th century. Only distances represented barriers to the invasion, while Siberian demographic and politogenetic desert facilitated it.

11 – In order to operate in the Balkans to the benefit of Balkan nations against Turkey (18th century), the Russian Baltic fleet had to go around most of Europe, without friendly harbours on its way, and wage war in a hostile (Ottoman) environment.

12 – Strength of the fleet itself was

insufficient and continental expansion was not possible due to the Romanian barrier to the Russian expansion toward the South, in order for the empire's establishment in the Straits.

13 – The solution of Russian maritime participation was the most promising with the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, but it could not have been realized due to Western objections (Congress of Berlin in 1878. According to the Treaty of San Stefano, Bulgaria (referred to as Great Bulgaria) was supposed to bridge Russia with the Aegean Sea.

14 – S – Russia's expansion is not only based on territory, but it is important (the most important) to solve the issue of accessing sea, but Serbia and Montenegro are too far away, isolated by Romanian ethnium, with Montenegro also not solving the issue of maritime participation for a long time (until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bar harbour), and Serbia did not solve it at all.

15 – I.-V. – Important centres of power outside of Russia (besides the Mongolian) which significantly affected its history (I – Swedish, II – Germans, III – Polish, IV – Lithuanians, V – Ottoman), because of which Russia's fear of containment politics is historically completely founded and understandable. It is especially important to notice that Russia always had to fight on both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea front with some of the most powerful European and Asian forces (Sweden, Turkey).

16 – Part of border Europe-Asia.

Map No. 3 Characteristics of 3G Positions of Russian Countries (Geotransportive, Geopolitical, Geostrategical)

The issue of 3G positions of Russia is such a comprehensive theme that giving up would be the most logical solution for all true laymen. However, it is still possible to provide some insight which combine with the textual and cartographic part to introduce the theme, which is to be analysed by more proficient authors.

drugih. U vrijeme dok se europski Zapad, preboljevši kugu u 14. st., gospodarski razvija i počinje spremati za globalna osvajanja, i to u uvjetima vrlo povoljne maritimnosti – Rusija se tek oslobađa divljačke azijske pohare, što je očito jedan od razloga za njeno sveukupno zaostajanje.

5 – b) – širi prostor Vrata naroda, dijela Ukrajine i azovsko-crnorskog primorja kao nestabilna zona izložena prodorima s Istoka, koja je sve do Petra Velikog (18. st.) bitno otežavala uspostavljanju russtva na svom jugu.

6 – Rusko širenje prema Baltiku i dugotrajno hrvanje sa Švedskom koja je uvelike potisnuta (Poltavska bitka 1709. god.) zapečaćeno je osnutkom i razvitkom Sankt Peterburga od 1703. god. Izuzetno značenje mora za tadašnju Rusiju vidi se i po tome što je u razdoblju 1712–1918. Sankt Peterburg glavni grad Rusije: luka i prozor u svijet važniji su od kopneno zatvorene i izolirane Moskovijske.

7 – A – Zbog postojanja mongolsko-osmanlijske barijere prema jugu Rusija se morala orijentirati ne samo prema Baltiku, nego i hladnim sjevernim morima (Bijelo more). U 16. st. osniva se Arhangeljsk, tu djeluju i čuveni novogordski trgovci. Arhangeljsk postaje (do osnutka Sankt Peterburga) važna ruska luka za trgovinu sa Zapadom. U potrazi za krznašima dosiže se i prostor Pečore.

8 – a) – Osvajanjima Ivana Groznog (16. st.) Moskovijska je po prvi puta poslije Mongola ozbiljno zakoračila na jug (osvojen je i Astrahanjski kanat), pri čemu se Rusija približila Vratima naroda koja vode u Sibir, a omogućeno je i da Volga bude velika ruska životna okosnica. Rusija time doseže Kaspijsko jezero, ali to nema šireg i odlučujućeg značenja, jer ono ne vodi nikuda, osim prema konkurentskoj Perziji.

8 – b) b) – Nakon nekadašnjeg normanskog (Varjazi) plovidbenog sustava Baltik – Zapadna Dvina – Dnjepr – Crno more (spomenuta "grčka cesta"), Volga (b) postaje važna unutrašnja poveznica i životna okosnica Rusije. Prije mongolskog razdoblja sa Sredozemljem trguju i novogordski

trgovci i to rijekama prema jugu (Crno more i Konstantinopol).

9 – Krajem 17. st. Rusija zauzima Azov, što znači da treba ovladati i Kerčkim vratima, a 1792. obale Crnog mora do ušća Dnjestra do Novorisijska pripale su Rusiji, nakon što je od Turaka osvojena Odessa (1791.), a 1830. anektiran je Krim.

10 – Već u 16. st. počinje ruski prodor prema Sibiru. Kao zapreka na tom prodoru stoje jedino udaljenosti, dok sve olakšava sibirski demografska i politogenetska pustoš.

11 – Da bi djelovala i na Balkanu u korist balkanskih naroda protiv Turke (18. st.) ruska baltička flota mora obići najveći dio Europe, i to bez prijateljskih usputnih luka, i ratovati u posvemašnjem neprijateljskom (osmanlijskom) okruženju.

12 – U ruskom širenju prema jugu, kako bi se carstvo nekako uspostavilo u Tjesnacima – snaga same flote nije bila dovoljna, a širenje kopnom nije bilo moguće zbog barijere rumunjskog etnikuma.

13 – Rješenje ruske maritimne participacije bilo je najizglednije 1878. godine sa San Stefanskim mirom, ali oni nije moglo biti ostvareno zbog protivljenja Zapada (Berlinski kongres 1878.). Po odredbama San Stefanskog mira, Bugarska (i to kao Velika Bugarska) trebala je imati mostnu ulogu u funkciji ruskog izlaza na Egejsko more.

14 – S – Širenje Rusije nema samo teritorijalnu osnovu interesa, nego je pri tome uvijek važno (i najvažnije) rješavanje pitanja pristupa moru, ali i Srbija i Crna Gora su predaleko, izolirane su rumunjskim etnikumom, pri čemu dugo vremena ni Crna Gora nije riješila pitanje maritimne participacije (tek na Berlinskom kongresu 1878., luka Bar), a Srbija nije riješila uopće.

15 – I–V. – Važna izvanruska središta moći (osim mongolskog), koja su bitno utjecala na njezinu povijest (I – Šveđani, II – Nijemci, III – Poljaci, IV – Litvanci, V – Osmanlije), zbog čega je strah Rusije od politike okruženja povijesno posve utemeljen i razumljiv. Posebno je pri tome važno uočiti da se

Rusija uvijek morala boriti na dvije fronte, onoj baltičkoj, i onoj crnomorskoj, i to s nekim od tadašnjih najjačih europskih i azijskih sila (Švedska, Turska).

16 – Dio granice Europe i Azije.


Zemljovid br. 3. Svojstva 3G položaja ruskih zemalja (geoprometni, geopolitički, geostrateški)

Pitanje 3G položaja Rusije toliko je zamašita tema da bi za sve istinske skromnike odustajanje bilo najlogičnije rješenje. Međutim, pri svemu tome ipak su moguće barem neke naznake koje u kumulaciji tekstovnog i zemljovidnog dijela pružaju mogućnosti nekog uvoda u samu temu koja se nadalje prepušta jačim perima.

U ovom prilogu pitanje se razmatra u okviru cjelovitog russtva kojeg čini rusko trojstvo, tj. njezina tri etnikuma: onaj velikoruski, zatim ukrajinski i bjeloruski, čemu treba dodati i one rubne prostore koji su s russtvom bili na ovaj ili onaj način duže ili kraće vrijeme povezani uz razumljive međutjecaje. Pojam "ruskih zemalja" i "ruskog trojstva" može se alternativno svesti na pojam "Rusije", što, dakako, valja razlučiti od Ruske Federacije.

Elementi položaja Rusije – opći geografski vidovi. Navedena tema može se na rezimirajući način sažeti u nekoliko točaka: prvo, za ruske zemlje je u najširem (čak i globalnom) smislu karakterističan naglašeni kontrast između zaista golemih kopnenih dimenzija, izuzetno dugih obala, u Svijetu maksimalnih dubina teritorija i participacije na svjetskim morima (Sjeverno ledeno more, Pacifik) i osobina zatvorenosti u odnosu na povoljnu svjetsku mora (zatvoren je Baltik, Crno more, zatvoreno je Japansko more, zatvoreno je Kaspijsko jezero). Otvoreno je jedino Sjeverno ledeno more, otvoreno je i Ohotsko more, ali je ta otvorenost od male koristi.

Dok u Zapadnoj Europi položaj uz more znači poziv u svijet, europska se Rusija suočava s ogromnim prostranstvima Azije, iz koje nadiru i



Map No. 3. Characteristics of 3G Positions of Russian Countries (Geotransportive, Geopolitical, Geostrategical)
Zemljovid br. 3. Osobine 3G položaja ruskih zemalja (geoprometni, geopolitički, geostrateški)

The issue discussed in this map within the entire Russianhood composed of the Russian trinity, i.e. its three etnikums: Great Russian, Ukrainian and Belarus, in addition to all the peripheral areas associated with Russianhood in one way or another for a brief or longer period of time. The terms "Russian countries" and "Russian trinity" can alternatively be reduced to the term "Russia", which of course has to be distinguished from the Russian Federation.

Elements of Russian position – basic geographic modes. This theme can be summarized in several points: first, Russian countries are broadly (even globally) characterized by the contrast between the truly vast continental part, exceptionally long coasts, maximum depth of territory in the World and participation in seas

(Arctic Ocean, Pacific Ocean) and enclosure in relation to favourable global seas (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Sea of Japan, Caspian Sea). Only the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk are open, but they are not very useful.

While position near sea in the Western Europe means an invitation to the word, European Russia is faced with vast expanses of Asia with its Mongolian and Ottoman dangers. While the rest of the maritime Europe is already preparing for the colonial period after recovering from the exhaustive Crusades (11th–13th century) and the plague (14th century), it was not until the 15th century that Russia was freed from Asian conquerors and started territorially forming Russianhood and was late to set out toward seas (18th century). The only advantage favouring Russia was

its closeness and openness toward Siberia, which would end up as the area of Russian colonialism (a type of territorially continuous colonies) in which conquests were not demanding because Siberia is desolate in all regards and does not hide an indigenous political will (as was the case in Caucasus and South West Asia). In addition to the enclosure established in natural characteristics, it also follows from geostrategic characteristics. At one time, Russia was enclosed by Sweden, Teutons, Lithuania, Poland and Ottoman. Nowadays, it is also enclosed by NATO, meaning it has the traditional problem of enclosure and rightfully suffers from geopolitical claustrophobia.

Furthermore, in a sense Russia has the ideal intermediate/transit position between Western and Middle

mongolska i osmalijska opasnost. I dok će se ostala maritimna Europa već pripremati za izlazak u svijet i kolonijalno razdoblje oporavivši se od iscrpljujućih križarskih ratova (11–13. st.) i od kuge (14. st.), Rusija će se tek u 15. st. osloboditi od azijskih osvajača i otpočeti teritorijalno formiranje ruskog carstva, u svakom slučaju, zakašnjelo krenuti prema morima (18. st.). Jedina prednost koja će pogodovati Rusiji jest blizina i otvorenost prema Sibiru, to će biti područje ruskog kolonijalizma (tip teritorijalno kontinuiranih kolonija) u kojem osvajački zahvati neće biti zahtjevni, jer je Sibir pust u svakom pogledu, ne krije nikakvu autohtonu političku volju, i u tom prostoru russtvo ne nailazi na konkurente (kao što je to bio slučaj na Kavkazu i u jugozapadnoj Aziji). Osim navedenog, što je prije svega utemeljeno u prirodoslovnim osobinama, zatvorenost slijedi i iz geostrateških osobina, tako da je nekada Rusija bila zatvorena i od Švedske, Teutonaca, Litve, Poljske i Osmanlija, a danas i od NATO-a, Rusija, dakle, osjeća tradicionalni problem okruženja i s pravom trpi od geopolitičke klaustrofobije.

Zatim, u određenom smislu, Rusija ima idealan posrednički/transzitni položaj između zapadne i Srednje Europe i životnih žarišta na Dalekom istoku (Kina, Japan, Koreja). Međutim, taj je položaj ostao gotovo nevaloriziran: udaljenosti su velike, između navedenih životnih žarišta postoji samo demografski i gospodarski desertum (osim donekle na jugu Sibira, gdje će proć Transsibirska željeznica), (ne)mogućnosti kopnenih komunikacija tjeraju u očaj, velike su rijeke, istina, plovne, ali posve beskorisno teku u Sjeverno ledeno more, što znači da se ne može pronaći niti jedna prednost koja bi bilo prisposobiva maritimnim mogućnostima Zapada, iako taj Zapad sve do 1869. god (Sueski prokop) povezuje svoje atlantsko pročelje s Dalekim istokom – oko Afrike: to je zaista daleko, ali se isplati, pri čemu je izuzetno važna jedna prednost: nema sukoba s protivnicima na kopnu, moru se može posvetiti u cijelosti. Važno je naglasiti da niti nakon izgradnje

Transsibirske željeznice (9441 km – mandžurska inačica dovršena 1901., a amurska 1916. godine). Rusija nije iskoristila potencijalnu ulogu europskog dalekoistočnog mosta, čak niti u onoj kraćoj varijanti (veza Transsibirske željeznice i Bejinga preko Mongolije), a što je posebno karakteristično, tako je i danas, jer Kina prodiere na europska tržišta, ne posredstvom Ruske Federacije, nego morskim putem preko Sueskog prokopa (a odatle i interes za Pirej, Rijeku i nizinsku željeznicu Rijeke prema zaleđu), a vrijedi to čak i onda kada su u pitanju crnomorske luke. Jedino što nas podsjeća na povijesno tranzitnu ulogu Rusije jest trenutak kada pijemo "ruski čaj", koji je zapravo – kineski.

Sve u svemu, zaostalost Rusije ima važna i opravdana opravdanja: dok je drugima more poklonjeno, ona se za njega morala krvavo boriti, sukobila se (i iscrpljivala) s dva izrazita osvajača svjetskih razmjera (Mongoli, Osmanlije). Rusija je tako ostala izvan glavnih životnih tokova i nije se mogla uključiti u tranzitne funkcije u odnosu na Daleki istok, u Europi je ostala izvan životnih tokova koji su vezani uz Levant, ostala je izvan veza Atlantik – Mitteleuropa i Sredozemlje – Mitteleuropa, a navedeno bili su važni pokretači svekolikog razvoja. Sve navedeno može se provjeriti na priloženim zemljovidima, koji očito otvaraju i nova pitanja.

Osnove zemljopisnog položaja ruskih zemalja. Rusko trojstvo (Rusija, Ukrajina i Bjelarus i osvojene zemlje i interesna područja).

1 – a) S obzirom na kopneni karakter ruskih regija jezgre, izvorno odijeljenih od mora – svaki je govor o položaju Rusije/ruskog trojstva nužno započeti s problemom pristupa morima i jezerima koja su uglavnom svugdje zatvorenog značaja (Baltik, Crno more, Kaspijsko jezero, Japansko more).

1 – b) A, A₁ – međutim, postoji i ruski pristup otvorenim morima (Sjeverno ledeno more, Ohotsko more, A1) ali je taj položaj od malog značenja.

1 – c) A₁, Ohotsko more je također jedno Sredozemlje, ali vrlo specifičnog karaktera, jer je od Pacifika odijeljeno samo jednom otočnom zonom. Ohotsko i Japansko more (B) može se promatrati i kao jedno jedinstveno Sredozemlje, koje se, kao i klasično Sredozemlje, sastoji od dvojstva: Ohotskog i Japanskog mora odijeljenih Tatarskim prolazom. Važnost participacije Rusije na otvorenim morima bitno je umanjeno činjenicom da su ona daleko od vlastitih ruskih i ostalih, pogotovo europskih životnih težišta.

2 – Izlazi/prolazi koji povezuju japansko sredozemlje s ostalim svjetskim morem nisu kontrolirani isključivo od Rusije, nego i od Japana (prolaz La Perousa), a za izlaz iz Japanskog mora prolaz Tsušima/Korejski prolaz kontroliraju još Japan i Koreja. Tatarski prolaz, kao veza Ohotskog i Japanskog mora samo je privid kada je riječ o modernoj plovidbi. Inače, Ohotsko more, kao jedno od svjetskih sredozemnih mora, u kojem apsolutno dominira Ruska federacija, ima za nju bitno strateško/obrambeno značenje.

3 – Murmansk – jedina istinski relevantna ruska luka locirana na otvorenom moru.

4 – ① – Velika i snažna povijesna ruska životna žarišta u Euroaziji, ② – kinesko životno žarište. Važno je naglasiti da se kopnene veze između ta dva životna žarišta nisu nikada mogle mjeriti s onim pomorskim između europskog Zapada i Indije/Kine (Mandžurija, Prava Kina), bilo oko Afrike, bilo putem Sueskog prokopa od 1869. iako su udaljenosti na tom euroazijskom kopnenom pravcu daleko manje, a isto tako manje i mogućnosti osporavanja od strane regionalnih čimbenika.

5 – 1 – Kao izvorno kopnena zemlja koja je uvijek, bez obzira na svoje impresivno teritorijalno širenje bila izolirana od svjetskih mora, Rusija se nužno morala okrenuti azijskom kopnu, a pretpostavka za to bio je veliki interes za velike prometne putove. Čak niti čuvena Transsibirska željeznica (1), koja se s pravom smatra za

Europe and focal points in the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). However, that position is almost not utilized at all: distances are great, there is only demographic and economical desert (except in the South of Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway), (in)abilities of continental communication are hopeless, rivers are long and navigable, but they uselessly flow toward the Arctic Ocean, which means there is not a single advantage to be compared to maritime possibilities of the West, even though until 1869 (Suez Canal) the West connects its Atlantic front with the Far East – around Africa: it is really far, but it pays off, with an important advantage: there are no struggles with rivals on the mainland and the sea can be dedicated to completely. It is important to point out that even the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (9441 km – Manchurian version complete in 1901 and Amurian in 1916) did not enable Russia to take advantage of the potential role of European Far East bridge, not even the shorter variant (connection of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Beijing via Mongolia), and what is especially characteristic, even nowadays, because China is breaking through to European markets, not via the Russian Federation, but on the sea through the Suez Canal (from which there is also interest in Piraeus, Rijeka and the railway between Rijeka and hinterland), which is true even when Black Sea harbours are in question. The only thing reminding us of the historically transit role of Russia is when we drink "Russian tea", which is actually – Chinese.

Altogether, Russia's backwardness has important and reasonable justification: while others were endowed with sea, Russia had to fiercely fight for it, it struggled with (and exhausted) two impressive global conquerors (Mongolians, Ottomans). Thus Russia was left out of the mainstream and could not be involved in transit functions of the Far East, and in Europe it was excluded from the mainstream related to Levant and Atlantic – Mitteleuropa and Mediterranean – Mitteleuropa, which drove development.

All of this can be verified using these maps, which obviously raise new questions.

Basics of geographic positions of Russian countries. Russian trinity (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and conquered countries and areas of interest)

1 – a) – Considering the continental character of Russian core regions, which were initially separated from sea – any discussion about the position of Russia/Russian trinity has to be started by analysing the issue of access to seas and lakes, most of which are closed (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Sea of Japan).

1 – b) A, A₁ – however, Russians also have access to open seas (Arctic Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk, A1), but it is not significant.

1 – c) A₁ – The Sea of Okhotsk can also be considered Mediterranean, but very specific, because the only thing separating it from the Pacific is an insular zone. The Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan (B) can also be considered as a unique Mediterranean, which also consists of two parts like the classical Mediterranean: the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan divided by the Strait of Tartary. The importance of Russian participation in open seas is significantly diminished by the fact that they are far from Russian and other (especially European) centres.

2 – Exits/passages connecting the Japanese Mediterranean with other global seas are not controlled exclusively by Russia, but also Japan (La Perouse), and the exit of the Japanese Sea, the Korea Strait is controlled by Japan and Korea. The Strait of Tartary, as the connection between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan is only an illusion when modern navigation is considered. The Sea of Okhotsk, as a global Mediterranean sea with absolute domination of the Russian Federation, is only important for Russia strategically and defensively.

3 – Murmansk – the only truly relevant Russian harbour located in the open sea

4 – ① – Great and powerful Russian foci in Eurasia, ② – Chinese focus. It is important to emphasize that conti-

ental connections between the two foci could never measure up against the maritime ones between the European West and India/China (Manchuria, True China), neither around Africa nor via the Suez Canal from 1869, even though distances in the Eurasian continental connection were much shorter and the probabilities of opposing by regional factors lesser.

5 – 1 – As a primarily continental country which has always been isolated from global seas, regardless of its impressive territorial expansion, it was necessary for Russia to turn to the Asian continent, and great interest in great transport routes was a precondition. Even the prominent Trans-Siberian Railway (1), which is rightfully considered one of Russian construction enterprises, could not compete with maritime connections, but it still represented the first and truly significant opening and connecting of Europe with Siberia and the Far East (if one does not count the old Silk Road dating back to Rome, but which only related to a part of China and not the Far East in the broad sense). Considering the Russian Trans-Siberian connection to Vladivostok, the Manchurian Railway (Chita-Harbin-Vladivostok) complete in 1901 also has to be mentioned (1a). However, its significant disadvantage is not being on Russian territory, which can be dangerous considering Japanese ambitions related to Manchuria, because of which Russia constructed indirectly to Vladivostok (Amurian version). As a Northern route, the Trans-Siberian Railway was not able to continue the Silk Road tradition, which mostly withered during the global maritime period and its adequate renovation was simply not possible. The old Silk Road avoided the forest and relief enclosure of the South Siberia, as well as large flows, which were not open until the Trans-Siberian Railway – and thus two great transport lines in Eurasia completely missed each other, which is actually a good thing, because conflicts were avoided. Russia could not be involved in expansive conquests in the South and build a transcontinental railway there; the Silk Road

jedan od ruskih građevinarskih poduhvata (uvelike izgrađena na osnovi kažnjeničkog rada), nije mogla konkurirati pomorskim vezama, ali je ipak značila prvo i zaista bitno otvaranje i povezivanje Europe sa Sibirom i Dalekim istokom (ako ne računamo starije Puteve svile koji datiraju još od doba Rima, ali koji se odnose samo na dio Kine, a ne i Daleki istok u širem smislu). U vezi s ruskom Transsibirskom vezom za Vladivostok, treba spomenuti i Mandžursku istočno-kinesku željeznicu (Čita-Harbin-Vladivostok) dovršenu 1901. god. (1a), koja međutim, ima bitni nedostatak što nije na ruskom teritoriju, a to može biti opasnu u odnosu na japanske ambicije prema Mandžuriji, zbog čega je Rusija poduzela gradnju zaobilaznom rutom prema Vladivostoku (amurska inačica). Transsibirska željeznica kao sjevernija ruta ipak nije mogla nastaviti tradiciju Puta svile, koji kao životna i prometna veza uvelike zamire u doba globalnog maritimnog razdoblja i njezina adekvatna obnova jednostavno nije bila moguća. Stari Put svile izbjegavao je šumsku i reljefnu zatvorenost južnog Sibira, kao i velike tokove, što je sve otvorila tek Transsibirska željeznica – i tako su se dva velika prometna/životna pravca u Euroaziji posve mimoišla, što je zapravo dobro, jer su izbjegnuti sukobi. Rusija se nije mogla upuštati u opsežnija osvajanja na jugu, i tamo graditi transkontinentalnu željeznicu, Put svile je izbjegao sjeverniju rusku dominaciju i fizičko – geografske probleme.

6 – a) 1b – Željeznički prodor iz Europe prema Pravoj Kini naglašen je i željezničkom prugom Ulan Ude – Ulaan Baatar – Peking iz sredine 1950-ih godina. Ulaan Baatar je staro trgovačko središte za Rusiju i Kinu, ali ta željeznička pruga nije značila povezivanje Europe i Kine preko Mongolije i Rusije.

6 – a) 2 – Pruga europska Rusija – Kazahstan – Džungarska vrata – Ujguriya – Urumči – ostala Kina, također ne znači bitniji prilog vezama Europe i Dalekog istoka.

6 – b) – Džunagrška vrata

7 – 3 – Kada je riječ o perspektivi prodora na Istok, onda treba spomenuti pomorski put (Glavsevmor put)

duž sjeverne obale europske Rusije i Sibira, što će ovisiti o klimatskim promjenama i drugim političkim pitanjima.

8 – N – Geopolitički je položaj Rusije kao međuprostora o odnosu na Indiju i Kinu takav da nije moguće isključiti niti mogućnost da su postojale francuske ambicije u doba Napoleona početkom 19. st., kako bi se preko Rusije (koja je i sama po sebi zamašit i dragocjen cilj) doseglo još jedan predragocjeni cilj, a to je Indija preko kopnenog mosta, jer to nije bilo moguće postići morem zbog britanske moći, bilo na pravcu oko Afrike, bilo kasnije posredstvom Sueskog prokopa, pri čemu je temeljito nepoznavanje fizičke geografije također imalo svog udjela u imperijalističkim tlapnjama.

9 – Međuprostor između ruske/europske životne jezgre i Indije s interesima Rusije i V. Britanije za prodorom prve prema Indiji, odnosno druge prema unutrašnjosti Azije. Taj stepsko – polupustinjski – pustinjski prostor relativno je lako savladiv idući iz Rusije, ali je prema jugu zagrađen visokim gorskim nizom Hindukuša (7750 m) i Tjan-šana (7439 m).

10 – Zbog različito usmjerenih interesa (ruskog i britanskog) logično je da je u ovom prostoru nastala jedna tamponska tvorevina (Afganistan) s provincijom Wakhan dugom oko 200 km, a širokom na najužem mjestu svega oko 20 km, koja je odijeljivala ruske i britanske interese, sve na osnovici vojno-politički nesavladivog afganistanskog etnikuma, čijoj nesavladivosti svjedočimo i dan-danas.

11 – T, I – Prostrani, brojčano, vojno i civilizacijski snažni etnikumi Turske i Perzije koji su nakon ruskog savladavanja Kavkaza (19. st.) spriječili daljnji prodor Rusije prema toplim morima.

12 – Povijesna Vrata naroda.

Zemljovid br. 4. Osnove položajnosti Mongolije

U odnosu na različite vrste položaja, Mongolija je u Svijetu zaista jedinstven slučaj:

1) Ona je već dugo vremena (od 17. st.) locirana između dviju očito

ekspanzionističkih velevlasti, pri čemu treba uočiti i snage i dimenzije, ta riječ je o – Rusiji i Kini. A ta lokacija očito ne može donijeti ništa dobra u doba kada se ostvaruje uvelike izvorna politička podjela Svijeta, koja je danas uglavnom dovršena.

- 2) A da bi stvar bila još i gora i teža – Mongolija je u skupini LLC država (Land Locked Countries), što znači da ne može imati prekomorske saveznike koji niti ne mogu savladati izolacionu ulogu nametnutu posredstvom i Rusije i Kine.
- 3) Mongolija je tamponska zona položena (dijelom) između vrlo gusto naseljene Prave Kine i praktički pustog i praznog Sibira, koji je pravi demografski i životni desertum (osim u uskoj zoni na jugu). A taj dodir i položaj između spomenutih kontrasta isto tako u budućnosti ne može donijeti ništa dobra. I najzad,
- 4) Mongolija je tamponski međuprostor u geostrateškom smislu između jedne velevlasti koja se vraća kao stara/nova moć u globalne odnose (Rusija) i jedne druge velevlasti koja nahrupljuje na sva vrata i prozore globalnih odnosa (Kina).

Imajući sve to u vidu, važno je istaknuti jedan novi, pozitivni i relaksirajući momenat, a taj je: Mongolija ima uvjeta da između spomenutih velevlasti postane i provozni prostor i poveznica. Dijelom je to već ostvareno željezničkom vezom od Transsibirske željeznice (Ulan Ude preko Ulaan Baatara za Peking), a moguće je da će uslijediti i povezanost energetskim cjevovodima, i to na jasnim osnovama: Sibir ima velike izvore energenata, Kina postaje nezajažljivi potrošač, a Mongolija je povoljno locirani međuprostor.

1 – a) 1-4 – Turkijsko (1) – tatarsko (2) – mongolsko (3) – mandžurska zona (4) važna od 17. st. kao diobeni/izolacioni prostor (I) između russtva (R) i hanstva (H) u Euroaziji. Iako su u tu zonu prodirali i Rusi (dio Swasiae, "pet država" i Tuva) i Kina (17. st.) putem dinastije mandžu koja se 1644.

avoided Northern Russian domination and physical-geographical issues.

6 - a) 1b - railway breach from Europe toward True China is also accentuated by the Ulan Ude - Ulan Bator - Beijing railway from the mid 1950's. Ulan Bator is an old centre of commerce for Russia and China, but the railway did not imply connecting Europe and China via Mongolia and Russia. 2 - Railway European Russia - Kazakhstan - Jungar Gate - Uiguria - Urumchi - rest of China also did not entail a significant connection between Europe and the Far East.

6 - b) - Jungar Gate.

7 - When the perspective of the breach of the East is considered, one has to note the maritime route (Glavsevmor Route) along the Northern coast of European Russia and Siberia, which is going to depend on climate changes and other political issues.

8 - N - Geopolitical position of Russia as a buffer zone in relation to India and China is such that one is not able to exclude the possibility of French ambitions during the period of Napoleon at the beginning of the 19th century, in order to reach another precious goal via Russia (which is itself a precious goal) which is India via the continent, because it was not possible to accomplish on sea due to British power around Africa or via the Suez Canal, where a fundamental lack of physical geography also played a role in imperialist delusions.

9 - Buffer zone between Russian/European core and India with interests of Russia and Great Britain in breaching India and other countries in Asia's interior. The steppe-half desert-desert area is easily surmountable from Russia, but its Southern part is inaccessible due to the mountains of Hindu Kush (7750 m) and Tian Shan (7439 m).

10 - Due to different interests (Russian and British), a logical conclusion was the creation of a buffer zone in this area (Afghanistan) with the Wakhan province about 200 km long and only 20 km wide at the narrowest part which divided Russian and British interests based on the militarily-politically indomitable Afghan

etnikum, which is still indomitable nowadays.

11 - T,I - Expansive, numerous, militarily and civilization strong etnikums of Turkey and Persia who stopped further breach of Russia toward warm seas after Russian conquest of Caucasus (19th century).

12 - Historical Doorway of Nation.

Map No. 4

Basic Position Characteristics of Mongolia

Mongolia is truly a unique case in the World in relation to various types of position:

- 1) It has been located between two clearly expansionist big powers (since 17th century), Russia and China, and one has to consider their power and size. Such a location can obviously not be good during a period of original political division of the World which has mostly been completed.
- 2) Another problem is Mongolia being an LLC (Land Locked Country), which means it can not have overseas allies who can not even overcome the isolation imposed by Russia and China.
- 3) Mongolia is a buffer zone partially between the densely populated True China and practically desolate Siberia, which is a true demographic desert (except the narrow zone in the South). Such a contact and position between contrasts can not bode well in the future. Finally,
- 4) Mongolia is a geostrategical buffer zone between one big power, which returns as an old/new power in global relations (Russia) and another one, which invades global relations (China).

Considering everything mentioned, it is important to point out a new, positive and relaxing moment: Mongolia has conditions to become a linking zone. It has already partially been realized by the Trans-Siberian Railway (Ulan Ude via Ulan Bator to Beijing), and it is possible an energy

pipeline will follow on clear foundations: Siberia has great energy sources, China has become an insatiable consumer and Mongolia is a favourably located buffer zone.

1 - a) 1-4 - Turkish (1) - Tatar (2) - Mongolian (3) - Manchurian zone (4) important since the 17th century as an isolation space (I) between Russianhood (R) and Hanhood (H) in Eurasia. Although both Russia (part of Swasia, "five countries" and Tuva) and China (17th century) invaded the zone, it was still a buffer zone stopping both Russia and China, which was fortunate for Asia, because Russian and Chinese imperialism as great political forces with ambitions and large territories were not in conflict.


1 - b) ① - Part of Swasia invaded by Russians to the Afghan province of Wakhan (1895) in the 19th century, while further expansion was not possible (Persian and British interests), which means the isolation came into effect (there was no isolation in the 13th century, when the impressive Mongolian expansion began toward the West, because Russians were far away, and Siberia was not owned by anyone, but the isolation came into full effect in the 17th century; in 1991, Soviets retreated from the area of "five countries", which also indicates isolation).

1 - c) - The area of Tuva (Tannu Tuva) became a part of USSR in 1944, after a long and intricate history including Russia and China.

1 - d) 2,3 - In the 17th century, Mongolia became a part of China and fortified its buffer role toward Russia, which expanded toward Siberia: in 1648, Russians breached the Chukchi Peninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk in 1649.

1 - e) 4 - Manchurian etnikum imposed upon China from 1644 to 1912, which means the mentioned buffer zone (1-4) also has an offensive/expansionist meaning, but is also an important constant: dividing Russianhood from Hanhood.

1 - f) M - Mongolian core region (13th century), which moved toward Outer Mongolia (capital of Karakorum).



Map No. 4. Basic Position Characteristics of Mongolia

Zemljovid br. 4. Osnove položajnosti Mongolije

uspostavila u Kini), ipak je to bila izolaciona zona preko koje nisu uspjeli prijeći ni Rusija, a niti Kina, što je bila sreća za Aziju, jer se ruski i kineski imperijalizam kao velike političke volje i ambicije i teritorijalne cjeline na velikim prostorima nisu sukobljavali.


1 - b) ① - dio Swasije u koju prodiru Rusi u 19. st. do afganistanske provincije Wakhan (1895), dok daljnje širenje nije bilo moguće (perzijski i britanski interesi), što znači da i tu dolazi do izražaja izolaciono značenje

(u 13. st. kada počinje impresivno širenje Mongola prema zapadu diobeno/izolaciono značenje još ne postoji, jer su Rusi daleko, a Sibir nije ničiji, ali će ono u 17. st. doći do punog izražaja; godine 1991. Sovjeti će se povući iz prostora "pet država", što također naglašava izolaciono značenje).

1 - c) - Područje Tuva (Tanu Tuva) koje je nakon duge i vrlo zapletene povijesti, u kojoj su sudjelovali i Rusija i Kina, priključeno SSSR-u 1944. godine.

1 - d) 2,3 - U 17. st. Mongolija je potpala pod Kinu i time učvrstila svoju ulogu tampona prema Rusiji, koja se intenzivno širi po Sibiru: 1648. godine Rusi će prodrjeti do Čukotskog poluotoka, a 1649. do Ohotskog mora.

1 - e) 4 - Mandžurski etnikum koji se nametnuo Kini od 1644. do 1912, što znači da spomenuti izolacioni prostor (1-4) ima i ofenzivno/ekspanzionističko značenje, ali je važna i konstanta: odjeljivanje russtva od hanstva.



Map No. 5. European Buffer Zones on Land and Sea
Zemljovid br. 5. Europski međuprostori na kopnu i moru

2 – Gradual expansion of Russianhood from European core regions toward the East is especially important in the 17th century (Yeniseisk 1618, Yakutsk 1632, Okhotsk 1649, Alaska 1741, Kamchatka 1725, foundation of Vladivostok in 1860)

3 – In contrast, China expanded toward the West, but with the mentioned buffer zone between Russianhood and Hanhood, so that the two imperialisms missed each other in Asia, which was fortunate. In 1885, Xinjiang became a part of China (completely in 1949), in 1652 Tibet recognized China (completely in 19520); it is important to note that new China was not interested in Russia and neither was Russia interested in China, except the Far East (Amur Oblast, Primorsky Krai), all of which secured peace in Asia. In addition, there was the mentioned buffer zone (1–4).

4 – Neither the Russians nor the Chinese ruled the Mongolian area permanently, the Russians managed to conquer the old Mongolian core region South East of Lake Baikal, but Outer Mongolia stayed intact.

5 – Railway connection between the Trans-Siberian Railway and Beijing from the 1950's.

Map No. 5 European Buffer Zones on Land and Sea

Fate of a buffer zone is one of the most important issues in understanding political-geographical/geopolitical reality of Europe because buffer zones are always a problem of relations between larger and stronger powers, which means the fate of a buffer zone is determined by others, up to the moment when they start

realizing special sovereignties based on their own political will.

There are four characteristic buffer zones in Europe and the border between Europe and Asia: 1) Finnish between Sweden and Russia, 2 – Polish between Germany and Russia, 3 – Balkan (including the medieval and Mediterranean Croatia, originally between Rome and Constantinople, subsequently between Austria-Hungary and Turkey), and 4 – Caucasus area between Russia, Turkey and Persia.

By definition, a buffer zone is a border territory between larger centres of power whose conquests/retreats significantly affect its political and economic fate. Therefore, the geopolitical/life fate of a buffer zone is always unfavourable, even though a buffer zone can also be under positive influence of a more developed civilization, such as the Polish or Balkan

1 – f) M – mongolska regija jezgre (13. st.), koja se pomiče prema Vanjskoj Mongoliji (prijestolnica Karakorum).

2 – Postupno širenje russtva iz europske regije jezgre prema istoku naročito važno u 17. st. (Jenisejsk 1618, Jakutsk 1632, Ohotsk 1649, da bi se 1741. stiglo u Aljasku, 1725. na Kamčatku, a 1860. bio osnovan Vladivos-tok).

3 – Za razliku, Kina se širi prema Zapadu, ali tako da između russtva i hanstva ostaje spomenuta izolaciona zona, tako da su se ta dva imperijalizma u Aziji mimoišla, što je bila vrlo sretna okolnost. Godine 1885. Xinjiang dolazi pod Kinu (definitivno 1949.), godine 1652. Tibet priznaje vlast Kine (definitivno 1950.), važno je pri tome uočiti da novovjeka Kina nije imala interesa za Rusiju, a niti Rusija za Kinu, osim na Dalekom istoku (Poamurje, Primorski kraj), što je sve osiguralo mir u Aziji. A osim toga, postoji i spomenuta tamponska zona (1–4).

4 – Ni Rusi, a ni Kinezi nisu trajno zavladaali mongolskim prostorom, istina, Rusi su se domogli stare mongolske regije jezgre jugoistočnije od Bajkalskog jezera, ali je Vanjska Mongolija ostala nedirnuta.

5 – Željeznička veza između Transsibirske željeznice i Pekinga iz 1950-ih godina.

Zemljovid br. 5. Europski međuprostori na kopnu i moru

Pitanje životne sudbine međuprostora jedno je od bitnih u razumijevanju političko-geografske/geopolitičke stvarnosti Europe, i to iz razloga jer su međuprostori uvijek problem odnosa među onima većim i snažnijima, što znači da u političku/životnu sudbinu međuprostora određuju oni drugi, i to sve do trenutka kada se u međuprostoru počnu ostvarivati posebne državnosti na osnovici vlastite političke volje.

U europskim okvirima, ali i na granici Europe prema Aziji, postoje četiri karakteristična međuprostora: 1) finski između Švedske i Rusije, 2) poljski između Njemačke i Rusije, 3) balkanski (kojemu i ovom slučaju

treba pridodati i srednjoeuropsku i mediteransku Hrvatsku, izvorno između Rima i Konstantinopolisa, a zatim između Austrougarske i Turske), i 4) kavkaski između Rusije, Turske i Perzije.

Po definiciji, međuprostor je granični teritorij između većih središta moći koje osvajalaštvom/povlačenjem bitno utječu na njegovu političku i gospodarsku sudbinu. Zato je geopolitička/životna sudbina međuprostora uvijek nepovoljna, iako međuprostor može biti i pod pozitivnim utjecajem neke razvijenije civilizacije, kao onaj poljski i balkanski, na granici germanskog i romanskog svijeta. Problem je međuprostora da se na povišnim odnosima snaga ne može trajno uspostaviti/održati, u smislu postojanja države, koje se u europskim međuprostorima ostvaruju tek u 20. st., i to ne uvijek i ne svugdje. Tako kavkaski prostor, tj. Predkavkazje, zapravo je još i danas u okviru krajnje zakašnjelog ruskog kolonijalnog sustava, koji je uvelike nestao 1990-ih godina (ali u Predkavkazju još ne u potpunosti) gdje i dalje traju pokušaji osnivanja muslimanske državnosti (emirat) – zato Predkavkazje i danas karakterizira status nedovršene politogeneze, baš kao i u slučaju BiH, Kosova, (ili još drastičnije – Transdnjestrje, ali bez izgleda za neki povoljni regionalni rezultat). Povijesno gledano, u najnepovoljnijoj su situaciji oni međuprostori koji se nalaze na putanjama jakih žarišta moći, a takav je upravo balkanski međuprostor.

1 – a) Kopneni europski međuprostori: 1 – švedsko-ruski (spram Finske), 2 – njemačko-ruski (spram Poljske), 3 – austrougarsko-turski (na Balkanu i rubovima) i 4 – rusko-turski na Kavkazu. Pri svem je važno spomenuti da germanski prodor na Istok i ruski na Zapad ostaju u okviru istog kontinenta, dok je onaj osmanlijski na sjeverozapad, a austrijski na jugoistok međukontinentalnog karaktera.

1 – b) Posve specifičnog značaja je međuprostor Sjevernog mora, s interesima Velike Britanije i Njemačke. U tom akvatoriju V. Britanija mora potiskivati Njemačku, dok Nizozemska nije u igri, jer za nju Sjeverno more ne

znači mnogo u odnosu na njezine interese na dalekim i debelim morima.

1 – c) U Europi pored navedenih postoje još dva međuprostora – to su nizozemski i švicarski, i to na tipičnim lokacijama mogućih različitih utjecaja: britanskih, njemačkih i francuskih u slučaju Nizozemske i njemačkih, austrijskih i francuskih u slučaju Švicarske. Održavanje malih naroda na takvim lokacijama pravi je podvig: u slučaju Švicarske on je razumljiv – životna sredina tu pruža vrlo malo (mala prehrambena baza i ostale sirovine), novi eventualni životni prostor veličinom nije impresivan, obrambene su mogućnosti velike, nema niti nekih značajnijih prometnih pravaca, izlaz na Sredozemlje zapriječava brojni i snažni talijanski etnikum – zbog svega navedenog Švicarska (u 13. st. pod dominacijom habsburških i savojskih grofova) praktički predstavlja međuprostor koji je međunarodno priznat tek 1648. godine. Donekle slične osobine vrijede i za Nizozemsku, ali za potpisanog ostaje nepoznanica kako se jedan relativno mali narod mogao održati i superiorno razviti na takvom važnom i osjetljivom geografskom/geopolitičkom položaju i u krajnje nepovoljnim prirodoslovnim uvjetima, kao što to vrijedi za širi prostor ušća Rajne, tj. na ušću jedne velike rijeke, koja otvara prostrano i gospodarski važno zaleđe, i vodenim i kopnenim putem. Objašnjenja koja su potpisanom pristupačna postoje, ali ona nisu dovoljna. Što se tiče Njemačke, ona nema snage za još jednu novu frontu (ona francuska sasvim je dovoljna), osim toga, Njemačka na Sjevernom moru raspolaže svojim lukama, V. Britanija i Francuska su više orijentirane prema debelim morima, također imaju svoje luke, čemu treba dodati neprijepornu snagu samog holandskog etnikuma ("Bog je stvorio zemlju, a Holandani su je za sebe napravili sami!"). A tom je etnikumu nezavisnost priznata još od 1648. god., dakle, nakon dominacije Habsburgovaca iz Španjolske, koji su, uostalom, bili isuviše daleko, da bi trajno mogli biti odlučujući/vladajući/politički čimbenik. I najzad, ušće Rajne dugo je vremena jedan od

one, on the border of the Germanic and Romanic world. The problem with a buffer zone is that its power can not be established or maintained permanently on historical relations, in the sense of being a country, which does not establish in European buffer zones prior to the 20th century, and neither always or everywhere. Thus the area of Caucasus, i.e. Pre-Caucasus, is nowadays really still within the late Russian colonial system, most of which disappeared in 1990's (but not completely in Pre-Caucasus), where there are still attempts of establishing Muslim sovereignty (emirate) – therefore Pre-Caucasus is still characterized by status of unfinished politogenesis, just like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (or even more drastic – Transnistria (Transdnistria), but without a chance for some favourable regional result). Historically, buffer zones in path of centres of power are in the worst situation, and the Balkan buffer zone is exactly that type of buffer zone.

1 – a) – Continental European buffer zones: 1 – Swedish-Russian (in relation to Finland), 2 – German-Russian (in relation to Poland), 3 – Austrian-Hungarian-Turkish (in the Balkans and the edges) and 4 – Russian-Turkish on Caucasus. It is important to mention that the Germanic invasion to the East and the Russian to the West remained on the same continent, while the Ottoman one to the Northwest and the Austrian toward the Southeast were intercontinental.

1 – b) – Buffer zone of the North Sea is very specific, with interests of Great Britain and Germany. In this sea area, Great Britain had to overpower Germany, while The Netherlands was not active, because it was not as interested in the North Sea as it was in distant and deep seas.

1 – c) There are two additional buffer zones in Europe – the Dutch and the Swiss ones in typical locations of various possible influences: British, German and French for the Dutch one and German, Austrian and French for the Swiss one. Maintaining small populations in such locations is a diffi-

cult endeavour: it is understandable for Switzerland – the environment does not offer much there (small food base and other resources), the new possible space is not impressive in size, defensive capabilities are strong, there are no significant transport routes, exit to the Mediterranean is blocked by numerous and powerful Italian etnikum, – therefore Switzerland (dominated by Habsburg and Savoyan countries) is practically a buffer zone which was not recognized internationally until 1648. Similar holds true for The Netherlands, but this author does not understand how such a small nation could have preserved and developed on such an important and sensitive geographic/geopolitical area and in very unfavourable natural conditions, i.e. the wider area of the mouth of Rhine, the mouth of a large river which opens an expansive and economically important hinterland, both on water and land. There are explanations, but they are not enough. Considering Germany, it did not have energy for another new front (the French one is quite enough). In addition, Germany has harbours in the North Sea, while Great Britain and France are more oriented toward deep seas, they also have their own harbours, with the undeniable force of the Dutch etnikum also worth mentioning ("God created earth, and the Dutch people created it for themselves!"). This etnikum had its independence recognized as early as 1648, i.e. after the Spanish domination by Habsburgs, who were too far away to be a crucial/governing/political factor. Finally, the mouth of Rhine had long been a hydrographically entirely disordered area (meliorations still continue). In addition, conquerors unwillingly enter areas they would have to make purposeful, because the logic of conquering is clear: use the existing and accomplished and do not make personal effort.

It is important that Rotterdam is competing with Amsterdam, so the construction of a new water route (Nieuwe Waterweg) in the second half of

the 19th century opens up new possibilities. In addition, it is already time in which no foreign interest can question The Netherlands as a country.

However, this is not everything – not only is The Netherlands a buffer zone, but the same is true for the area of Scheldt (Belgium). It becoming a country in 1831 obviously had some international geopolitical factors at work, i.e. a buffer zone between Germany and France was necessary.

2 – A problematic buffer zone for some political forces is still Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 – a) – The Balkan buffer zone is in the most difficult historical situation because it is located on the trajectory of an intercontinental interest, which refers to Mitteleuropa and the Persian Gulf (Baghdad Railway), which is much wider than interests directed toward one buffer zone, as is the case for 1, 2 and 4.

3 – b) – The main relatively recent Germanic invasion was directed toward Russia (Drang nach Osten)

4 – European seas as (complete/double) buffer zone, a) Baltic Sea – complete – double buffer zone between Russia and Sweden, b) – The Adriatic Sea also as a complete buffer zone in relation to Italy and Austria-Hungary, c) – Aegean Sea, also a complete buffer zone in relation to Greece and Turkey, which is also true for d) – Black Sea, because of Russia and Turkey. Cases a), b) and c) relate to completely conquering aspirations from both coasts, while d) is characterized by a one-way ambition (Ottoman).

5 – M – Moscovia as an origin and toward the Baltic Sea, Mitteleuropa and Caucasus.

Map No. 6 Serbia – Historical and Geographic Modes: Position and Expansion of Serbia from the Original Core Region

Serbia and sea. Much of European history can be reduced to the maritime component, both its stimulating and exceptionally difficult

hidrografski posve neuređenih prostora (melioracije se nastavljaju i danas). Osim toga, svaki osvajač nerado ulazi u prostor, koji bi tek on morao privesti svrsi, jer je logika osvajalaštva jasna: okoristiti se postojećim i dostignutim, a ne izlagati se vlastitim naporima.

Važno je, da za Rotterdam postoji i konkurencija Amsterdama, tako da tek izgradnja novog vodenog puta (Nieuwe Waterweg) u drugoj polovici 19. st. otvara nove mogućnosti. Osim toga, to je već doba kada nikakvi strani interesi ne mogu dovesti u pitanje Nizozemsku kao državu.

Međutim, to nije sve – nije samo Nizozemska međuprostor, nego se to odnosi i na područje Šelde (Belgija), za čiji su nastanak kao države 1831. Očito morali djelovati neki međunarodni geopolitički čimbenici, tj. bio je potreban jedan tamponski prostor između Njemačke i Francuske.

2 – Kao problematični međuprostor za neke političke snage još se i danas izdvaja Bosna i Hercegovina.

3 – a) – U najtežoj je povijesnoj situaciji balkanski međuprostor, jer je lociran i na putanji jednog međukontinentalnog interesa, koji se odnosi na Mitteleuropu i Perzijski zaljev (Bagdadska željeznica), a to je daleko šire od onih interesa usmjerenih samo prema nekom međuprostoru, kao što je to slučaj s 1, 2 i 4.

3 – b) – U relativno još novije doba glavni je germanski prodor bio usmjeren prema Rusiji (Drang nach Osten).

4 – Europska mora kao (potpuni/dvostruki) međuprostor, a) Baltičko more – potpuni – dvostruki međuprostor između Rusije i Švedske, b) – Jadran kao također potpuni međuprostor, s obzirom na Italiju i Austrogarsku, c) – Egejsko more, isto tako potpuni međuprostor, s obzirom na Grčku i Tursku, što vrijedi i za d) – Crno more, zbog Rusije i Turske. U slučaju a), b) i c) – radi se o potpunim osvajalačkim težnjama, dakle, s obje obale, dok slučaj d) karakterizira samo jednostrana težnja (ona osmanlijska).

5 – M – Moskovijska kao ishodište i prema Baltiku, Mitteleuropi i Kavkazu.

Zemljovid br. 6.

Srbija – povijesni i geografski vidovi: položaj i širenje Srbije iz izvorne regije jezgre

Srbija i more. Veliki dio europske povijesti mogao bi se svesti na maritimnu sastavnicu, bilo u vidu da je ona imala poticajno, bilo izuzetno teško i inhibirajuće značenje. I u tom smislu Srbija je zanimljiv i poučan primjer, koji je podjednako važan i u kontekstu prošlosti i sadašnjosti.

Teritorijalno širenje Srbije (ma kako ono bilo impresivno) nije otvorilo nikakvu perspektivu za rješenje njezine maritimne participacije: Srbija je izvorno bila (i ostala) kontinentski zatvoren prostor zbog čega je zanimljivo usporediti povijesni geopolitički položaj Hrvatske i Srbije, naime, dok su se Hrvati odmah podoseljenu čvrsto uspostavili na moru, pri čemu je dio Jadrana posve opravdano postao njihov mare nostrum (11. st.) i gdje su odmah inicijalno nastali njihova regija jezgre u obalnom trokutu Nin – Knin – Cetina s obalskim produžetkom na Crvenu Hrvatsku prema jugoistoku, dotle se Srbija stalno morala boriti za pristup moru, da na kraju ne uspije, i to uz poraz u hrvatskom i bosansko-hercegovačkom ratu 1990-ih godina, kada je definitivno nestala mogućnost za bilo kakvu "Veliku Srbiju" do crte Virovitica – Daruvar – Pakrac – Sava – Sisak – Karlovac – Gospić – Karlobag, od čega srpska radikalija zapravo ne odustaje niti danas, ali čime se nećemo baviti.

1 – I. – Izvorna gorska srpska/radikalna regija jezgre s logičnim pravcima širenja.

2 – Širenje prema Pomoravlju (1a, 1b) i Kosovu (1c).

3 – II. – Na taj način nakon rasapa Dušanove države i poraza u kosovskoj bitci (sve 14. st.) središte srpstva koncentriralo se u području triju Morava s Nišom, da bi stalno postojala tendencija širenja prema sjeveru (Podunavlje) i prema jugu (Stara Srbija /Makedonija)

4 – a) 2 – Međutim, sva širenja i uspostavljanje novih životnih težišta (sekundarne/izvedene regije jezgre)

ne rješavaju pitanje odnosa Srbije i mora, i to iz razloga što nastojanje da se dopre do mora nailazi na više prepreka. (2) Širenje je prema Jadranu otežano/onemogućeno prirodoslovno vrlo teškom i nepristupačnom prirodnom sredinom (visoki reljef, krš, duboki kanjoni, općenito teška prohodnost), a sve uz vrlo male životne mogućnosti koje ne mogu privlačiti i biti oslonac jednog bogatijeg i složenijeg života, da bi se onda na kraju (eventualno) doprlo do mora koje je gorskom zaleđu ipak posve strana životna sredina.

4 – b) – Osim toga, na tom pravcu širenja postoje i druge politogenetske jezgre i ambicije (Crvena Hrvatska i Crna Gora), što ima bitno otežavajuće značenje važno i u slučaju crnogorskog otpora Osmanlijama.

5 – 3 – Isto je tako otežano i eventualno rješenje preko BiH/Hrvatske do hrvatske obale zbog također postojećih drugih politogenetskih ambicija i relativno znatnih udaljenosti, što je sve bio prevelik zalogaj za neki uspješni osvajački pohod, dok je vlastita demografska snaga ipak bila preslaba za naseljavanje, koje bi onda bilo temelj za političko/teritorijalno svojtanje. Drugim riječima, u BiH se razvijaju vlastite državnosti, i to u jednoj dobro branjenoj geostrateškoj jezgri, koja očito nije sinonim bogatstva, te stoga i nije tako neodoljivo privlačna.

6 – ④ – Prilike za uspostavljanje na zapadnijem Jadranskom moru pružale su se i s osmanlijskom osvajateljima. Ali, iako se srpstvo proširilo uz pomoć Osmanlija (Pečka patrijaršija 1557–1766, migracije na sjeverozapad i pretvaranje Vlaha u Srbe), od toga u smislu maritimizacije nije bilo velike koristi, jer Osmanlije nisu bili pomorski narod: njihova su osvajanja išla kopnom (Hrvatska – Panonija – Srednja Europa), pri čemu jadranska obala nije imala značenja ni u doba maksimalnih turskih osvajanja, a niti u doba kada se na sjeveroistočnoj obali Jadrana uspostavila Venecija.

Osmanlijski prodor imao je bitno značenje za temeljito prestrukturiranje odnosa snaga na Balkanu (s rubovima). Iako bi trebalo izbjegavati

and inhibiting importance. Thus Serbia is an interesting and instructive example, equally important in the context of history and the present.

The territorial expansion of Serbia (as impressive as it may be) did not provide a new perspective for solving its maritime participation: Serbia was originally (and still is) a continentally close area, making it interesting to compare historical geopolitical positions of Croatia and Serbia. Namely, Croats established themselves on sea as soon as they arrived, with a part of the Adriatic Sea understandably becoming their *mare nostrum* (11th century) and where their core region originated within the coastal triangle Nin – Knin – Cetina with a coastal extension to Red Croatia toward Southeast. Meanwhile, Serbia had to fight constantly to access sea and finally fail after being defeated in the Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovina war in the 1990's, when there was no possibility left for any kind of "Great Serbia" up to Virovitica – Daruvar – Pakrac – Sava – Sisak – Karlovac – Gospić – Karlobag. Serbian radicals still do not give up the idea, but this issue is not going to be discussed further.

1 – I. – Original mountain Serbian/Raška core region with logical expansion routes.

2 – Expansion toward the area of Morava (1a, 1b) and Kosovo (1c).

3 – II. – Thus after the end of the Dušan State and defeat in the Battle of Kosovo (until the 14th century), Serbia was centred in the area of three Morava rivers with Niš, but at all times there were tendencies for expanding toward North (area of Danube) and South (Old Serbia/Macedonia).

4 – a) 2 – However, all expansions and establishing of new centres (secondary/derived core regions) do not solve the issue of Serbia and sea because there were several obstacles in efforts to reach sea. (2) Expansion toward the Adriatic Sea was made difficult/impossible by very difficult and inaccessible natural environment (high relief, karst, deep canyons, and generally difficult movement) on top of very bad life possibilities which can

not attract or support a richer and more complex life, and finally eventually reach the sea, which is a completely foreign environment to the mountainous hinterland.

4 – b) – In addition, there were other politogenetic cores and ambitions (Red Croatia and Montenegro) in the way of the expansion, which is also important for the Montenegrin resistance to Ottomans.

5 – 3 – The possible solution via Bosnia and Herzegovina/Croatia toward the Croatian coast is also made difficult because of other politogenetic ambitions and relatively significant distances, all of which was too much for a successful conquest, while its own demographic force was still too weak for settling, which would have been the foundation of political/territorial ownership. In other words, proper sovereignties developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a well-defended geostrategic core, but obviously not a synonym for richness and consequently not irresistible.

6 – ④ – Opportunities for establishing in the Western part of the Adriatic Sea were also available to Ottoman conquerors. However, although Serbia expanded with help from Ottoman (Peć Patriarchy 1557–1766, migrations to Northwest and conversion of Vlachs to Serbs), there was not much use of it for maritime, because Ottomans were not a maritime nation: their expansion was continental (Croatia – Pannonia – Central Europe), with the Adriatic Sea coast not being important neither during greatest Turkish conquests nor when Venice was being established on the North-eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea.

The Ottoman invasion was significantly important for fundamental restructuring of power relations in The Balkans (with borders). Although "what if" discussions should be avoided, some conclusions are compellingly imposed, i.e.: this area (without Ottoman) would have had three centres of power: central Dušan's Empire (which would have eventually obviously lost the Greek and Albanian *etnikum*), Western Croatian-Hungarian


Kingdom (with Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Bulgaria in the East. Byzantium would have survived, but only as a territorially narrow remnant of old glory, as well as Greece, while other would have been endangered by barbarians.

7 – AU – However, while some possibilities of maritime participation of Serbia existed during the Ottoman period, they definitely ceased to exist with the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, when Bosnia and Herzegovina became a firm wall for any kind of Serbian attempt to access sea.

8 – 5 – With the gradual territorial expansion of Serbia, it became a Danube area factor, but that transport route toward the East/Black Sea did not mean much, because there was no way to go from the Black Sea basin and it was difficult to get there due to Đerdap cliff, while Serbia itself did not have sufficient economic power to become a significant Danube factor. Therefore, Danube remained a relatively important international transport route, but without a significant share of Serbia. In sum, although it is important, Danube is a more modest economic/life phenomena when compared with Rhine: nevertheless, it also connects Central Europe with a sea, but it is closed because it does not lead further East as is the case with North-western coasts of Turkey, True Levant and Fertile Crescent.

9 – 6 – The possibility of expansion toward the Bay Medovski was prevented primarily by strong Albanians, which could not be overcome even in the state of disorder of the Ottoman sultanate in the Balkan War.

10 – 7 – Expansion toward Bulgaria and possible solution to maritime participation by breaking through to the Aegean Sea was not successful even during the time of greatest territorial expansion of the Dušan's Empire (14th century), and especially not after failures of the Serbian-Bulgarian War (1885) and the Balkan War (1913). While Macedonia, which was owned by Bulgaria, became a part of Serbia (1913), Solun was still elusive. Considering the circumstances, Bulgaria



Map No. 6. Serbia – Historical and Geographic Modes: Position and Expansion of Serbia from the Original Core Region

Zemljovid br. 6. Srbija – povijesni i geografski vidovi: položaj i širenje Srbije iz izvorne regije jezgre

raspravljanje u stilu "što bi bilo, kad bi bilo" – neki se zaključci neodoljivo nameću, tj. taj bi prostor (bez Osmanlija) imao tri jaka žarišta moći: u središtu Dušanovo carstvo (koje bi s vremenom očito izgubilo grčki i albanski etnikum), na zapadu Hrvatsko-ugarsko kraljevstvo (s Bosnom i Hercegovinom) i na istoku Bugarsku. Bizant bi opstojao, ali samo kao teritorijalno skućeni prežitak stare slave, kojemu bi se otela i Grčka, dok bi drugo ugrozili barbari.


7 – AU – Međutim, dok su za Osmanlije neke mogućnosti maritimne participacije ipak postojale, one za Srbiju definitivno nestaju s austrijskom okupacijom BiH 1878. godine, kada BiH postaje čvrsta brana za bilo kakav srbijanski pristup moru.

8 – 5 – S postupnim teritorijalnim širenjem Srbije, ona je postala i podunavski čimbenik, ali, taj je prometni pravac prema istoku/Crnom moru značio relativno vrlo malo, jer se iz bazena Crnog mora nije imalo kuda stići, a teško je bilo do tamo doprijeti zbog Đerdapske klisure, dok sama Srbija nije imala dovoljno gospodarske snage da postane važniji podunavski čimbenik, tako da je Dunav ostao, istina, relativno važan međunarodni plovni put, ali i bez bitnijeg udjela Srbije. Sve u svemu, uza sve svoje značenje Dunav je u usporedbi s Rajnom ipak skromnija gospodarska/životna pojava: doduše, i on veže Srednju Europu s jednim morem, ali je ono zatvoreno, jer ne vodi dalje na istok kao što se to odnosi na sjeverozapadne

obale Turske, Pravi Levant i Plodni polumjesec.

9 – 6 – Eventualno širenje prema Medovskom zaljevu bilo je onemogućeno prije svega snažnom albanskom etničkom prečagom, koja nije mogla biti savladana čak niti u općem rasulu osmanlijskog sultanata u Balkanskom ratu.

10 – 7 – Širenje prema Bugarskoj i eventualno rješavanje maritimne participacije tako da se preko njezina teritorija izbije na Egejsko more nije uspijevalo čak niti u doba maksimalnog teritorijalnog proširenja za Dušanovog carstva (14. st.), a pogotovo ne kasnije kada ništa nije riješio ni Srpsko-bugarski rat (1885), niti balkanski rat (1913). Istina, Makedonija, koju je svojatala Bugarska, pripala je Srbiji



Map No. 7. Buffer Zone between Austria-Hungary and Turkey
Zemljovid br. 7. Meduprostor između Austrougarske i Turske

itself did not succeed in establishing itself permanently on the coasts of the Aegean Sea (only from 1912 to 1919), let alone Serbia.

11 – 8 – Finally, in expanding toward the South, Serbia could also not access the sea because of impenetrable Greek force.

12 – a) 9 – In sum, the initial curse of continental enclosure was supplemented by such geographic (including distances), demographic, political and economic factors that it was impossible for Serbia to become a maritime country. It was not until the first Yugoslavia that Serbia solved (via an intermediary) the issue via Croatia, i.e. harbours of Sušak, Šibenik and Split, because neither Bar nor Ploče existed at the moment.

12 – b) – Parts which became parts of Italy during the first Yugoslavia.

13 – In sum, the conclusion is clear. With the exception of the first Yugoslavia period, Serbia is faced with a difficult problem of accessing sea. Therefore, it is interesting to note the position of Croatian etnikum: originally, its core region was in the triangle of sea coast-Nin-Zrmanja-Knin-Cetina in addition to the still strong ethnic hinterland in Hercegovina. Precisely the unity of coast and hinterland was a developmental advantage of Croatia, in spite of everyone and everything.

Map No. 7 Buffer Zone between Austria-Hungary and Turkey

The first Yugoslavia (1918) as a political/geopolitical "solution" in the buffer zone between former European big powers: Austria-Hun-

gary and Turkey.

An important characteristic of this part of Europe located South-eastern of Central Europe (it is not really "South-eastern Europe", but Central Southern Europe) is that it is a buffer zone less important by main participants, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which includes two negative characteristics: there are two peripheries which were paid no heed from the centre, their contact: the first means possible neglect and the other means everything a location among enemies implies.

1 – Countries among the remains of Austria-Hungary.

2 – Turkey after losing most of territory in Europe.

3 – 4 – Serbia (3), Montenegro (4) as independent and recognized countries prior to World War I.

(1913), ali Solun je i dalje nedostižan. Osim toga, prilike su takve da se ni sama Bugarska nije uspjela trajno uspostaviti na obalama Egejskog mora (jedino od 1912. do 1919.), a kamoli bi to mogla Srbija.

11 – 8 – I najzad, u širenju prema jugu nesavladiva je bila snažna grčka prečaga, tako da niti ovdje Srbija nije mogla riješiti pitanje pristupa moru.

12 – a) 9 – A sve to znači da je inicijalno prokletstvo kontinentalne zaptvorenosti dopunjeno takvim geografskim (u čemu su važne i udaljenosti), demografskim, političkim i gospodarskim čimbenicima, koji su Srbiji onemogućili da postane primorska država. I tek za prve Jugoslavije, Srbija rješava (makar i preko posrednika) to pitanje putem Hrvatske, i to preko luka Sušak, Šibenik i Split, jer još ne postoje ni Bar, a niti Ploče.

12 – b) – Dijelovi koji su za prve Jugoslavije pripali Italiji.

13 – Iz svega navedenog, zaključak je, dakle, jasan. Osim za vrijeme druge Jugoslavije, Srbija je suočena s teškim problemom vlastitog pristupa moru, zato je, za usporedbu, zanimljivo uočiti položaj hrvatskog etnikuma: izvorno, njegova se regija jezgre nalazi u trokutu morska obala-Nin-Zrmanja-Knin-Cetina, čemu treba dodati još i danas snažno etničko zaleđe u Hercegovini. I upravo je to jedinstvo obale i zaleđa bila prednost razvitka i opstojnosti Hrvatske svima i svemu usprkos.

Zemljovid br. 7.

Međuprostor između Austro-Ugarske i Turske

Prva Jugoslavija (1918. god.) kao političko/geopolitičko "rješenje" u međuprostoru između bivših europskih velevlasti: Austro-Ugarske i Turske.

Bitna osobina tog dijela Europe smještenog jugoistočnije od Srednje Europe (pri čemu to nije nikakva "jugoistočna Europa", nego Središnja južna Europa) da se radi o međuprostoru koji je kao međuprostor manje važan od glavnih sudionika odnosa tj. Austro-Ugarske i Turske, što uključuje dvije negativne osobine: postoje,

naime, dvije periferije za koje se malo marilo iz središta, njihov međusobni dodir: prvo znači moguću zapuštenost na rubu interesa, a drugo sve ono što donosi lokacija među neprijateljima.

1 – Države na prostoru ostatka Austro-Ugarske.

2 – Turska nakon gubitka većine posjeda u Europi.

3 – 4 – Srbija (3), Crna Gora (4) kao nezavisne i priznate države prije Prvog svjetskog rata.

5 – a b c – Prva Jugoslavija s potpunim gospodarsko-zemljopisnim profilom: Panonija (a), gorska jezera (b) i primorje (c).

6 – S prvom Jugoslavijom Srbija napokon (makar i neizravno) rješava pitanje pristupa Jadranu.

7 – Prometni pravac savsko-moravsko-varždarskom udolinom između Europe i Levanta/Bliskog istoka velikog ne samo gospodarskog nego i geopolitičkog značenja

8 – Iako je Italija dijelom stupila svojim posjedom na sjevernoistočnu obalu Jadrana – ipak je prva Jugoslavija bila ujedno i prepreka pretvaranju Jadrana u posvemašnje talijanski "mare nostrum".

Zemljovid br. 8.

Položajnost Turske Hrvatske u kontekstu povijesnog zemljopisa

Osmanlijskim prodorom na Balkanski poluotok (tada to još nije bio Balkan!) hrvatske zemlje doživljavaju bitnu transformaciju barem u tri različita vida: prvo, nestaje hrvatski etnički međuprostor u zapadnoj i sjeverozapadnoj Bosni kasnije poznat kao Turska Hrvatska (koji je i zbog etničkog sastava i položaja bio logična potencijalna spojnica i poveznica između Primorske i Panonske Hrvatske). Zbog toga je mogućnost da taj prostor postane životna i težišna jezgra Hrvatske i hrvatstva posvema nestala.

Drugo, životno se sve više afirmira sjeverozapad Hrvatske, čime stara hrvatska regija jezgre na Primorju, izložene i mletačkom pritisku, gubi na značenju.

I treće, pomicanjem životnih težišta prema sjeverozapadu, goranski reljefni prag (Gorski kotar) postaje važna

prometna spojnica između Panonije i kvarnerskog primorja, unatoč relativnih reljefnih nepogodnosti.

1 – Gorsko-kotlinska Hrvatska, spojni prostor Istre i ostalog Hrvatskog primorja (koje se proteže između Savudrijske vale, i rta Oštra na Prevlaci) s Peripanonskom i Panonskom Hrvatskom.

2 – a) ① – Primorska, ujedno i primarna izvorna hrvatska regija jezgre između obale, Nina, Knina i Cetine (Bijela Hrvatska). Osim važne participacije na moru, također je važno uočiti postojanje životno relativno vrijednog zaleđa, s velikim geostrateškim prednostima pojedinih lokaliteta (Knin, Klis...).

2 – b) – 1a – Crvena Hrvatska, koja zauzima prostor do sjeverne Albanije, što nije izraz nikakvog hrvatskog osvajaštva, i nacionalizma nego nekadašnjeg narodnosnog stanja

2 – c) – 2a – Prostori stare hrvatske naseljenosti (Panonija), izgubljeni u skladu s odnosima snaga, pri čemu odnos s Mađarima (10. st.) ima samo obrambeni karakter, dok odnos s hrvatstvom u BiH – (d) – 2a₁) – također nije u okviru nikakvog osvajaštva, nego je tek izraz protežnosti starog hrvatskog etnikuma (ikavskog i katoličkog).

3 – ② – Sekundarna panonska/peripanonska hrvatska regija jezgre, čije značenje bitno raste u 16. st., u svezi osmanlijskih osvajanja.

4 – a) ③ T.H. – Središnji hrvatski etnički međuprostor između najdonje Kupe, preko Une, sve do Vrbasa i Vrbanje (povijesno nazvan Turska Hrvatska – T.H.). Po svom smještaju i potencijalima položaja, prirodna je spojnica između Primorske i Panonske Hrvatske i isto tako potencijalno težište hrvatske državnosti, što se nije moglo ostvariti zbog Osmanlija.

4 – b) Taj prostor neprijepornog hrvatstva prije Osmanlija (velikaški rod Hrvatinića) uključuje i dvije velike prometnice, važne za povezivanje Primorske i Panonske Hrvatske, tj. one Pounjem (a) i Povrbasjem.

5 – ④ – Međutim, zbog osmanlijskog prodora (15. st.), taj izgubljeni prostor nije mogao preuzeti nikakvu logičnu ulogu u kontekstu hrvatske državnosti utemeljenu na osobinama lokacije.

5 – a, b, c – first Yugoslavia with complete economic – geographic profile: Pannonia (a), mountain lakes (b) and littoral (c).

6 – Serbia finally (even though indirectly) solved the issue of accessing the Adriatic Sea with first Yugoslavia.

7 – The transport route via the Sava-Morava-Vardar vale between Europe and Levant/Near East with great economic and geopolitical importance

8 – Although Italy partially set foot on the North-eastern coast of the Adriatic, the first Yugoslavia was at the same time an obstacle for turning the Adriatic Sea in an entirely Italian "mare nostrum".

Map No. 8

Position of Turkish Croatia within the Context of Historical Geography

The Ottoman invasion of the Balkan Peninsula (not Balkan at the time!) meant that Croatian countries significantly transformed in at least three ways: first, the Croatian ethnic buffer zone in the Western and North-western Bosnia subsequently known as Turkish Croatia disappeared (which was a logical potential connection between the Littoral and Pannonian Croatia due to its population and position). Therefore, there was no longer a possibility for that area to become a centre core of Croatia and Croatian people.

Second, North-western Croatia became increasingly more populated, which makes the old Croatian core region in the Littoral, exposed to the Viennese, less important.

And – third, by moving vital centres toward the Northwest, Gorski kotar became an important transport connection between Pannonia and the Kvarner littoral, in spite of relative relief disadvantages.

1 – Mountain-Basin Croatia, area connecting Istria and the rest of Croatian Littoral (which extends from the Gulf of Piran and the Cape Oštro on Prevlaka) with Peri-pannonian and Pannonian Croatia.

2 – a) ① – Littoral, at the same time primary originally Croatian core region between the coast, Nin, Knin and Cetina (White Croatia). In addition to important participation at sea, it is also important to note the existence of a relatively valuable hinterland with great geostrategic advantages of particular localities (Knin, Klis...).

2 – b) 1a – Red Croatia, which extends to Northern Albania, which is not an expression of Croatian conquest and nationalism, but former state of nationality.

2 – c) 2a – Areas of old Croatian settlement (Pannonij), lost according to relations of power, with the relation with the Hungarians (10th century) having only a defensive character, while the relation with Croatian people in Bosnia and Hercegovina – (d) – 2a₁) – is also not any form of conquest, but is an expression of the extent of old Croatian etnikum (Ikavian and Catholic).

3 – ② – Secondary Pannonian/Peri-pannonian Croatian core region, whose importance grew significantly in the 16th century, in relation to Ottoman conquests.

4 – a)-(3) – T.H. – Central Croatian ethnic buffer zone between lowest

Kupa, via Una, all the way to Vrbas and Vrbanja (historically called Turkish Croatia – T.H.). According to its location and position potentials, it is a natural connection between the Littoral and Pannonian Croatia, as well as a potential centre of Croatian sovereignty, which could not be realized due to Ottomans.


4 – b) – The area of undeniable Croatian sovereignty prior to Ottomans (noble family Hrvatinčić) included two great roads important for connecting Littoral and Pannonian Croatia, i.e. area of Una (a) and area of Vrbas.

5 – ④ – However, due to Ottoman invasion (15th century), the lost area could not take any logical role within the context of Croatian sovereignty based on location characteristics.

6 – At the time, Gorski kotar is of a completely peripheral importance, but its transport role was related to Ottoman conquests. Namely, as a connection between Littoral and Pannonian Croatia, there first appeared the Bihać Route (a), then the Modruš Route (b). It was not until the Turkish weakening in relation to new needs within the context of connecting Pannonia and the Northern Adriatic that Gorski kotar was found on the important backbone of Croatia (Zagreb – Sisak – Karlovac with the Gulf of Kvarner and Senj (c)).

In such a way, the exceptionally topographic peripheral position of Gorski kotar and the Ogulin-Plaški submontanus valley) obtained exceptional functional importance and some of its position characteristics became some of its most important characteristics. ■

Map No. 8. Position of Turkish Croatia within the Context of Historical Geography ►
Zemljovid br. 8. Položajnost Turske Hrvatske u kontekstu povijesnog zemljopisa ►



6 – U doba o kojemu je riječ, Gorski kotar ima posve periferni značaj, ali se upravo u svezi s osmanlijskim osvajanjima začinje njegovo prometno značenje. Naime, kao veza Primorske i Panonske Hrvatske najprije nestaje Bihački put (a), a zatim i Modruški put

(b), i tek će nova sigurnost slabljenjem Turske u vezi s novim potrebama u kontekstu povezanosti Panonija – sjeverni Jadran, uvjetovati da se Gorski kotar nađe na važnoj životnoj okosnici Hrvatske (veza Zagreb – Sisak – Karlovac s riječkim zaljevom i Senjom (c)).

Na taj će način izrazito periferni položaj Gorskog kotara u funkcionalnom smislu dobiti izrazito središnje značenje, i od tada će (neke) prednosti položajnosti postati jedna od najbitnijih značajki toga prostora. ■